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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature of the Case

This is a systemic civil rights class action seeking solely declaratory and prospective
relief to remedy statewide structural deficiencies in Idaho's public defense system. To obtain
prospective relief that will prevent the violation of constitutional rights, plaintiffs in civil rights
suits generally must show that they face a substantial risk of harm, such that court intervention is
warranted. This Court and the Supreme Court of the United States have made this clear in a
variety of contexts.

The standard is no different in cases, like this one, where Appellants

("Plaintiffs") allege that structural deficiencies in the State's indigent defense system threaten
their right to effective assistance of counsel under the Idaho and United States Constitutions.
Plaintiffs must show that the State's policies have resulted in systemic deficiencies in the
provision of indigent defense, and that those deficiencies pose a substantial risk that class
members will be denied effective assistance of counsel.
Plaintiffs' evidence shows exactly that.

Using data generated by the Respondents

("State") themselves and expert analysis, Plaintiffs have shown that Idaho's public defense
system suffers from many of the structural deficiencies that courts across the country have found
present an unacceptable risk of harm to indigent defendants. This evidence has revealed that
Idaho's indigent defense system, among other things, requires defenders to shoulder
overwhelming caseloads, fails to protect defender independence, does not ensure that defenders
are adequately supervised or sufficiently trained, creates financial incentives that encourage
quick resolution over thorough representation, and offers inadequate safeguards for confidential
attorney-client communications. These structural deficiencies are more than enough to warrant
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prospective relief, requiring the State to bring its system into compliance with constitutional
standards and protect indigent defendants’ fundamental right to counsel.
The State, however, tries to shift the focus away from structural deficiencies in the
system as a whole, arguing that Plaintiffs must prove that individual class members, in each
county in Idaho, have already been denied their right to effective assistance of counsel. That
approach is wrong, both legally and factually. Legally, this standard would be tantamount to the
type of retrospective, individualized showing of prejudice required to overturn a conviction for
ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)—a
showing that, as this Court already held, has no place in cases like this one seeking prospective
relief from structural, systemic deficiencies. The State’s argument also ignores the basic legal
principle that once a class is certified, as it has been in this case, Plaintiffs need not establish
actual harm to each individual class member, or even some subset of individual class members,
to obtain prospective relief. And as a factual matter, the State’s effort to focus the Court’s
attention on harm to individual indigent defendants in each county yields nothing that will help
the Court assess the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. After all, whether a class member in a particular
county has already suffered ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland says little about
the overall structure or health of the State’s indigent defense system, or whether that system
poses a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants across the State.
Following numerous state and federal courts across the country, this Court should hold
that to obtain prospective, class-wide relief, Plaintiffs’ burden is to establish that the State’s
indigent defense system as a whole poses a substantial risk that indigent defendants will not
receive representation that meets constitutional standards, and that the type of statewide
statistical data, expert analysis, and documentary evidence that Plaintiffs have adduced is
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sufficient to meet that burden. The fundamental right to counsel, enshrined in our United States
and Idaho Constitutions, is too vital to our criminal justice system to allow these systemic risks
to persist without remedy.
II.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint against the State of Idaho, its Governor, and
the members of the Idaho Public Defense Commission ("PDC") in 2015, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief to remedy the State's failure "to provide effective legal representation to
[indigent criminal defendants across the State of Idaho], in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, of Article I, Section 13, of the Idaho
Constitution, and of Idaho statutes and regulations." R., p. 146, 201-204, paras. 4-5. In 2017,
this Court reversed the district court's initial holding that the claims were not justiciable on
standing, ripeness, and separation of powers grounds, and remanded the case for continued
proceedings against the State and the individual members of the PDC. Tucker v. State, 162
Idaho 11, 394 P.3d 54 (2017). This Court specifically observed at that time that Plaintiffs'
claims do not necessitate the "case-by-case inquiries" called for in retrospective ineffective
assistance of counsel analysis under Strickland. Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19-20, 394 P.3d at 62-63.
This Court explained that, instead, "[ s]ystemic inadequacies in a public defense system" can
serve as the basis for Plaintiffs' claimed structural deprivation of constitutional rights. Id. at 20,
394 P.3d at 63.
On January 17, 2018, the district court granted Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification,
R., p. 899-925, confirming that "[t]his case will examine the State and the PDC's policies and
practices concerning public defender services in the State of Idaho .... " R., p. 914.

An

intensive discovery period followed. The State produced documents and data showing that, in
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spite of some limited progress in funding and standard-setting in the years since this lawsuit was
filed, Idaho's public defense system continues to suffer from shortcomings in staffing,
independence, resources, and training and supervision, among other areas.
The parties filed cross Motions for Summary Judgment in late 2018. R., p. 2166-68; R.,
p. 9692-9777; R., p. 2541-43; R., p. 2544-2610. On March 19, 2019, the district court denied
both motions, concluding that immediate appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court was necessary to
ascertain the legal standard applicable to Plaintiffs' systemic constitutional challenge.

R.,

p. 5547-80. The Idaho Supreme Court granted permission to appeal on April 11, 2019, noting
that "[t]he singular issue to be presented to the Court is, what is the standard to be used in a
lawsuit challenging the public defense system for the State of Idaho? What is the burden of the
respective parties going forward?" R., p. 5592.
III.

Statement of Relevant Facts

Persistent deficiencies in Idaho's indigent defense system continue to place indigent
defendants at substantial risk of receiving representation that fails to fulfill their right to effective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. R., p. 143-146, para. 1-5. Evidence that the State itself
assembled and produced establishes that Idaho's statewide indigent defense system suffers from
the following defects:
•

Defending attorneys in many counties, including in the state's most populated
counties, continue to be burdened with excessive caseloads that exceed both national
and State-generated standards;

•

Representation of both in-custody and out-of-custody indigent defendants at initial
appearances continues to be inconsistent or non-existent;

•

Defending attorneys continue to contend with undue political and judicial influence,
including from the ongoing involvement of county prosecutors in the selection,
evaluation, and oversight of their public defender adversaries;
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Numerous counties continue to employ fixed-fee contracts (or their functional
equivalent) that incentivize hasty disposition of cases rather than zealous
representation;



The system still lacks sufficient supervision, evaluations, and training;



Resources for crucial investigation and expert services relating to indigent defense
remain limited and underused; and



A breathtakingly small number of cases go to trial.

Individually and cumulatively, these serious and ongoing failures of the Idaho indigent defense
system create a substantial and unacceptable risk of harm to indigent defendants that persists in
spite of halting steps the State has taken in recent years to address the system’s widespread and
long-documented flaws.
Appellants discuss the evidence revealing these structural defects in detail in their
summary judgment briefing in the district court. See, e.g., R., p. 9728–56. For purposes of
providing context for this appeal, Plaintiffs highlight below a few of the more debilitating
conditions.
A. The System Overburdens Most Defenders.
In 1973, the National Advisory Commission (“NAC”) published standards providing that
a defending attorney’s annual caseload should not exceed 150 felonies, 400 misdemeanors, or
200 juvenile court cases.
Defense

(Black

Letter),

Nat’l Advisory Comm’n on Criminal Standards and Goals, The
Standard

13.12

Workload

of

Public

Defenders

http://www.nlada.org/defender-standards/national-advisory-commission/black-letter.

(1973),
These

standards were “far too high[,] even in 1973.” R., p. 9879. Today, as the State’s expert
acknowledges, the NAC Standards are “out of date when you consider the increased complexity
of criminal cases due to the availability of forensic and video evidence.” R., p. 9929.
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Nevertheless, the American Bar Association's ("ABA") baseline Ten Principles of a Public
Defense Delivery System (hereinafter "ABA Ten Principles") adopted the NAC standards as a
cap, providing that the NAC standards "should in no event be exceeded" in an indigent defense
system.

ABA, Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System 2 & n.19 (2002),

https ://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aha/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_s
claid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf.
In Idaho, indigent defender caseloads in at least 22 of the 44 counties exceeded the NAC
Standards in 2017, and 19 counties exceeded the NAC Standards in 2018. R., p 12879; R.,
p. 14347-49. Moreover, public defenders in the 19 counties that were short-staffed in 2018 were
responsible for handling more than 89% of the State's total reported indigent defense cases that
year, and 90% of the State's indigent felony cases. R., p. 14347-49. In other words, indigent
defendants are represented by attorneys whose caseloads exceed even the lenient ABA/NAC
maximum standards most of the time.
Seventeen of Idaho's counties do not meet the even more forgiving caseload standards
that the PDC established in 2018. R., p. 2641; R., p. 5556. The PDC's lax standards permit
defending attorneys to maintain workloads of up to 2 active capital cases at a time, and set
annual limits of 210 non-capital felonies, 520 misdemeanor cases, 232 juvenile cases, 608 civil
cases, or 35 non-capital substantive appeal cases. R., p. 10909. 1 The State's own data shows
that most public defense cases in 2018 took place in counties that exceeded even those
permissive standards. R., p. 14347-49.

1

The PDC makes compliance with this standard contingent on the appropriation of State funds
"at a level necessary to implement the numeric standard," and also allows counties to exceed
these caseload standards as long as they provide a "justifiable reason" to the PDC and attest that
constitutional representation was provided. See R., p. 10910.
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Moreover, the PDC’s assessment of the number of counties that would exceed NAC and
PDC standards are optimistic, at best, because the PDC fails to account for private caseloads
(which the PDC does not track), the time constraints of supervisory responsibilities, vacation
time, holidays, sick leave, and training. R., p. 5348:09–5355:01. Even then, by the PDC’s own
design, in the many counties where attorneys handle workloads near, at, or above the PDC
standards, their caseloads allow them only time for “minimal work” per case: low-level charges
only, without trial and with no or minimal investigation. R., p. 10923; R., p. 10040:20–23,
10043:2–20, 10043:2–20, 10046:2–10047:8, 10057:7–10058:5.
Finally, almost all counties (38 of 44) permit defending attorneys to maintain a private
practice on top of their indigent defense work, without accounting for the number or nature of
private cases the attorneys are handling. R., p. 11041–12627. Thus, many defenders cannot
devote all of their working time to handling their indigent defense caseloads. Idaho’s system
deprives most Idaho indigent defendants of the most basic level of legal assistance.
B. The System Permits Undue Political and Judicial Influence.
The United States and Idaho Constitutions require that the public defense function be
“independent from political influence and subject to judicial supervision only in the same
manner and to the same extent as retained counsel.” ABA Ten Principles at 2; see also Polk Cty.
v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 321–322 (1981) (recognizing that the Constitution requires the State
and its political subdivisions to “respect the professional independence of the public defenders
whom it engages”). In structure and actual practice, however, Idaho’s public defense system
gives prosecutors, judges, and partisan county officials undue sway.
In terms of structure, the board of county commissioners in each county oversees
defenders, with help from their legal counsel: the county prosecutor, who is also “in charge of
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prosecuting those individuals who are receiving public defense services at the county’s hand.”
See R., p. 10986:2–13; see also I.C. § 31-2604(3). In practice, these prosecutors are legal
advisors who have significant influence over public defenders. As the district court has found,
meeting minutes from county commissioner meetings show that prosecuting attorneys advise
counties on public defense issues; help draw up public defender contracts; participate in public
defender hiring decisions; and review and advocate for reducing public defenders’ invoices. R.,
p. 5561; R., p. 11024, 11025, 11018–20, 11021–23; R., p. 10998–11017; R., p. 10943–79; R.,
p. 10278 (discussing Boundary County’s practice of “using the prosecutor to review [defending
attorneys’] hours”). Moreover, some county commissioners have refused to discuss public
defense without a prosecuting attorney present. R., p. 10278 (citing Kootenai Chief Public
Defender’s “concerns regarding [the elected prosecutor’s] influence on her budget” due to the
county commissioners’ “refus[al] to meet one-on-one” to discuss public defense “without the
prosecuting attorney present”).
Prosecutors are not the only conflicted parties with a hand in defender supervision:
judges and county officials in some counties review defending attorneys’ hours and bills as well.
R., p. 10967 (May 2018 email from Kimberly Simmons agreeing that Payette County judges’
review of defending attorney bills violates the requirement that the system be “free of political
and judicial influence”). This is especially problematic in those counties where the courts and
county officials’ roles as gatekeepers of funds for investigators, experts, and other necessary
resources will undoubtedly make defending attorneys think twice before making requests for the
resources they need to mount a viable defense.

See, e.g., R., p. 10275–77 (PDC list of

designated deficiencies, designating a “non–willful” deficiency due to improper “judicial
influence as the Judge is reviewing the public defender’s bill and striking items”); R., p. 10967;
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see also R., p. 12932 (defending attorney requesting advice on the IACDL listserv after learning

that "the county treasurer/commissioners are interested in reviewing sensitive expert billing
materials for matters already ordered paid by the money judge").

The risks of harmful

consequences to indigent defendants relying on Idaho public defenders susceptible to pervasive
political and judicial influence are substantial.
C. The System Financially Incentivizes Ineffective Representation.

Fixed-fee contracts create a perverse financial incentive to do as little work on cases as
possible, inconsistent with a lawyer's professional and ethical obligations.

Such contracts

dissuade defenders from conducting basic client interviews, investigations, and legal research;
discourage defenders from seeking additional funds to access investigators, forensic services,
and experts; and promote quick case resolutions, regardless of whether an early plea is in a
client's best interest. For these reasons, the ABA Ten Principles and Idaho law prohibit fixedfee contracts and their functional equivalents.
Despite Idaho's statutory ban on fixed-fee contracts, these contracts are still widespread
across the state. No fewer than 19 counties engage indigent defenders pursuant to fixed-fee
contracts or their functional equivalents.

R., p. 11041--42.

At least 28 counties require

defending attorneys to seek advance approval from either the court or the county commissioners
before devoting additional funds for investigation and expert expenditures-dissuading
defenders from pursuing needed funding at the risk of further complicating the independence
issues discussed above. R., p. 5561; R., p. 11041--42. In addition, 38 counties permit defending
attorneys to maintain a private practice on top of their indigent defense work, without requiring
any accounting of the number or nature of private cases the attorneys are handling.

R.,

p. 11041--42. This incentivizes disposition of indigent defense cases as quickly as possible in
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order to maximize the time available to spend on more lucrative private cases. All of these
arrangements generate predictable and obvious financial disincentives for effective indigent
defense work.
D. The System Lacks Sufficient Training and Supervision.
The State recognizes that defending attorneys’ ability, training, and experience must
match the complexity of a case in order for representation to be constitutional. R., p. 16453:9–
16455:25. As the PDC also appreciates, “if there is no review and supervision” of defending
attorneys, it cannot “ensure that . . . constitutional representation is occurring.” R., p. 5369:1–11.
Yet, despite this admission, Idaho’s public defense system does not meet minimal standards for
ensuring competence and supervision.
Counties across the State lack any review process or supervision for conflict or contract
attorneys. R., p. 16572–81; R., p. 12899 (expert noting that defending attorney contracts “do not
require supervision of the contracting attorneys or ongoing evaluations of attorney
performance”). The PDC’s three regional coordinators merely act as a liaison between the PDC
and county officials, and assist with PDC funding applications; they do not engage in meaningful
supervision of individual defenders’ work. In the 2018 annual reviews conducted by the regional
coordinators, for example, none of them could verify primary and conflict defending attorneys’
qualifications for public defense work in any of the 44 counties.

R., p. 16572–81. Nor, as a

practical matter, could the current structure yield any meaningful supervision:

The PDC

employs just three regional coordinators, who have been tasked with overseeing indigent defense
services in 18, 16, and 10 counties, respectively. When asked if regional coordinators are
responsible for monitoring day-to-day operations of public defenders, one regional coordinator
responded simply: “I am one person. I have eighteen counties.” R., p. 10360:11–13. Finally,
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contracts in 26 counties do not require that defending attorneys possess any specialized
qualifications or otherwise ensure that attorneys are adequately qualified to handle complex
criminal cases. R., p. 11041-42.
Constitutionally effective indigent defense is at substantial risk because the State’s
system lacks capacity and structures to assure adequate supervision and evaluation of defending
attorneys.
E. The System Does Not Ensure Adequate Access to and Use of Investigation and
Expert Resources.
Defending attorneys must have access to investigation and expert resources in order “to
assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense.” R., p. 9748 (quoting Ake
v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985); see also R., p. 10021:18-10023:2 (acknowledging that
access to investigative resources is critical for a public defense system). But, according to the
2017 and 2018 county annual reports, a startling number of defending attorneys reported no
investigation or expert expenditures at all in the prior fiscal year. Contract defenders in 19 of
Idaho’s 44 counties reported devoting zero dollars to investigation expenditures in both 2017 and
2018. R., p. 5559; R., p. 14351–16427. A closer look at the 2018 reports reveals an even graver
picture. Of the 182 FY2018 annual reports submitted by contract public defenders and produced
to Plaintiffs, only 31 (just over 15 percent) reported any sort of expenditures beyond the
contractual fixed fee amount. R., p. 14351–16427. Of those 31 reports, only seven (or just four
percent of all contract defenders) affirmatively indicated that the reported extra-contractual
expenditures were for investigation or expert witnesses. R., p. 14646–50, 14835–40, 14962–67,
15191–15205, 15354–57, 16148–52, 16356–59.
The number of dedicated investigators employed by the institutional defense offices in
Idaho is also shockingly low. In 2017, the 12 institutional offices, which employ a total of
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approximately 150 attorneys, together employed only 16 full-or part-time investigators. R.,
p. 12678-12877; R., p. 5559. National standards call for a minimum of one investigator for
every three attorneys in an office. R., p. 2252, para. 44. Access to and use of investigative
services in aid of indigent defense in Idaho is negligible by any standard. It also falls far short of
the amount of investigative resources available to prosecutors in Idaho.

See, e.g., R.,

p. 10091: 19-10092:6. (noting that prosecutors have access to law enforcement budgets and other
entities); see also R., p. 10403-04. The State has thus perpetuated a substantial risk that indigent
defendants' appointed counsel will not have or use the resources necessary to thoroughly
consider and challenge the prosecution's case.

F. The System Fails to Ensure Representation at Many Initial Appearances in
Idaho.
Indigent defendants are entitled to counsel at initial appearances under Idaho law. I.C.R.
5(g)(l ). Despite the critical nature of these proceedings, however, at least 38 Idaho counties
have indicated that they either do not provide counsel for out-of-custody defendants at initial
appearances or have failed to report on initial appearances for out-of-custody defendants. R.,
p. 10403-10404 (at least three counties do not provide counsel for in-custody defendants at
initial appearance) .2 In the 18 instances where the PDC' s regional coordinators reported that
attorneys were present for initial appearances, attorneys still had not been appointed until the
initial appearance itself.

See R., p. 10405-10788.

Such eleventh-hour appointment inhibits

meaningful and confidential pre-hearing attorney-client communication and investigation that
might support pretrial release or another favorable outcome. See R., p. 9884-85; R., p. 12894;
2

The PDC's Annual Reviews, summarized at R, p. 10403-10404, indicate that 39 counties either
did not provide a defending attorney at initial appearances for out-of-custody defendants or
failed to report on initial appearances for out-of-custody defendants. A subsequent declaration
by John Stosich stated that Jefferson County does provide representation at initial appearances
for out-of-custody defendants. R., p. 3633-47.
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see also R., p. 10963 (noting concern that “only a couple minutes of lead time will not allow an
attorney to provide effective representation for a bond hearing”); R., p. 10077:3–23. Moreover,
defending attorneys appear at initial proceedings by phone or videoconference in some counties,
making it even less likely that defending attorneys will have the opportunity to meet or talk with
clients in a confidential setting in advance of the initial hearing. R., p. 10405–10788. Many
indigent defendants in Idaho are thus essentially left to fend for themselves at what should be a
key moment of their constitutionally guaranteed defense.
G. The PDC Has Demonstrated That It Is Unable to Fix Idaho’s Broken System.
Four years after the National Legal Aid & Defender Association first highlighted the
deficiencies in Idaho’s system, and several years since the State expanded the PDC’s authority
after this case was filed, the PDC has still not promulgated the full set of rules and standards
mandated by statute. See I.C. §§ 19-849, 19-850; Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n, The Guarantee
of Counsel: Advocacy & Due Process in Idaho’s Trial Courts: Evalutation of Trial-Level
Indigent Defense Systems in Idaho iii, 2–3 (2010) (hereinafter “NLADA Report”),
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/id_guaranteeofcounseljseri01-2010_report.pdf; I.C. § 19850(1)(a); PDC, Rules Governing the Standards for Defending Attorneys that Utilize Idaho’s
Principles of an Indigent Defense Delivery System: I.C. § 67-5220(3)(f) Written Summary 2,
http://pdc.idaho.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2017/01/Negotiated-Rulemaking-WrittenSummary-2016-Standards.docx (“[T]he PDC decided not to promulgate standards across all ten
of Idaho’s Principles of a[n] Indigent Defense Delivery System because it was determined that
doing so would be overwhelming to the counties . . . ”); R., p. 9980:5–6 (“[W]e don’t have all
the standards yet. You know, everything is so incremental.”), 9983:3–13, 9993:18-9994:1 (no
standard for Principle I), 9997:7–13 (no standard for Principle II), 10010:7–12 (no standard for
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Principle IV); R., p. 10064:3-21, 10067:13-19, 10070:13-22, 10095:6-16 ; R., p. 10118:1110119:19, 10129:20-10130:14. Where the PDC has adopted rules at all, it has adopted rules
which are ineffective, unenforced, or both. For instance, the PDC' s workload standard falls far
short of national standards, and relies on the self-defeating assumption that attorneys with high
caseloads will perform only "minimal work" on any of their cases. See supra, at 7. As the
ongoing deficiencies described above demonstrate clearly, activity is not the same as
achievement.

It is now past time to require that the State fully meet its constitutional and

statutory obligations to Idaho's indigent defendants.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

What is the standard for obtaining prospective relief in a lawsuit challenging the
adequacy of the State of Idaho's public defense system under the United States and Idaho
Constitutions?

B.

What is the burden of the respective parties going forward?

C.

Are Plaintiffs entitled to attorneys' fees?

ARGUMENT
As this Court has previously made clear, "[t]he State [] has ultimate responsibility to
ensure that the public defense system passes constitutional muster. While the provision of public
defense has been delegated to Idaho's forty-four counties under Idaho Code Section 19-859, the
ultimate responsibility for fulfilling the ... constitutional duty cannot be delegated." Tucker, 162
Idaho at 21, 394 P.3d at 64 (internal citations omitted).

State law requires the PDC to

"promulgate rules governing training and caseload reporting requirements," among other things,
to assist the State in meeting this obligation. See id. at 24, 394 P.3d at 67 (citing LC. § 19850(1)(a) (2015)). The State and the PDC thus owe indigent defendants a duty to provide them
with "effective assistance of counsel" that will engage in "meaningful" testing of the
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prosecution’s case as a “diligent conscientious advocate.” State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 7–8, 539
P.2d 556, 559–560 (1975); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984).
The State has failed to perform this duty. So Plaintiffs seek prospective relief requiring
the State to protect indigent defendants’ right to counsel.

Plaintiffs’ lawsuit is not

unprecedented. It is one of a number of cases across the country that have invoked the Sixth
Amendment and corresponding state law to remedy public defense systems’ structural flaws.
These cases do not involve claims by individual indigent defendants seeking retrospective, postconviction relief in their particular criminal cases. Rather, these cases involve systemic claims
for prospective relief to address structural deficiencies that create a substantial risk of Sixth
Amendment violations across a public defense system.

Sixth Amendment jurisprudence

recognizes the fundamental difference between these claims. Claims for retrospective relief to
undo criminal convictions must clear a high bar, including a showing of actual prejudice, to
protect the finality of criminal judgments. Strickland, 566 U.S. at 697–698. But claims for
prospective relief to prevent constitutional harm only in the future call for a different standard:
Plaintiffs must only show a substantial risk of future harm. E.g., Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d
1012, 1016–17 (11th Cir. 1988); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715, 746 (Pa. 2016).
This distinction is grounded in the fundamental principle of equity that to obtain
prospective relief a plaintiff must show a substantial risk of future harm. The distinction makes
logical sense.

Individual post-conviction claims seek to vacate criminal convictions or

sentences. Structural claims seeking prospective relief, by contrast, do not disturb finality in
criminal proceedings; rather, they seek to prevent constitutional harm from occurring in the first
place. This Court should therefore join federal and state courts from across the country and hold
that Plaintiffs need only show that the State’s actions and omissions result in certain structural
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deficiencies that create a substantial risk of harm that indigent defendants will suffer actual or
constructive denials of counsel.
To meet this standard, Plaintiffs must produce evidence showing that the structure of the
State's indigent defense system presents a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants
purportedly served by it. Many courts, as well as the ABA and even the PDC, have identified an
array of elements that an indigent defense framework must have in order to provide
constitutionally adequate services to indigent defendants.

Among other things, an indigent

defense system must ensure manageable defender caseloads, protect defender independence, and
provide adequate resources for experts and investigators.

Where, as here, Plaintiffs have

adduced empirical evidence, produced by the State in discovery, that these safeguards are
missing, they have established a substantial risk that indigent defendants' right to effective
assistance of counsel will be violated. Prospective relief is therefore warranted to prevent such
future harm.
I.

The Applicable Standard: To Obtain Prospective Relief, Plaintiffs Must Show That
Idaho's Public Defense System Presents a Substantial Risk to Class Members of
Future Sixth Amendment Violations.
A. Injunctive Relief Addresses Risks of Future Harm.
Injunctive relief, as Plaintiffs seek here, is designed to "to prevent injury, threatened and

probable to result, unless interrupted." Miller v. Ririe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 252, 132 Idaho 385,
388, 973 P.2d 156, 159 (1999) (quoting Cazier v. Economy Cash Stores, Inc., 71 Idaho 178, 187,
228 P.2d 436, 441 (1951)); cf Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)
(Plaintiffs need not "await the consummation of threatened injury to obtain preventive relief.").
Courts regularly issue injunctions to prevent a risk of future violations of constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Miller, 132 Idaho at 388-389, 973 P.2d at 159-160 (injunction preventing violation of

due process rights); New York Cty. Lawyers' Ass 'n v. State, 745 N.Y.S.2d 376, 385 (Sup. Ct.,
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N.Y. Cty. 2002) (“Granting prospective relief to secure constitutional standards in state
proceedings based on evidence of the likelihood of depriving fundamental and statutory rights
has long been within the province of the courts.”). Even where the conduct threatening or
causing injury has ceased, the trial court should issue an injunction unless it is “convinced that
‘there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’” O’Boskey v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Boise, 112 Idaho 1002, 1007, 739 P.2d 301, 306 (1987) (quoting United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)).
B. In Systemic Sixth Amendment Cases Seeking Prospective Relief, Courts Have
Required Plaintiffs to Show a Risk of Future Harm Imposed by Systemic
Limitations, Not a Retrospective Showing of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
for Each Named Plaintiff and Individual Class Member.
Plaintiffs’ Sixth Amendment claims, like claims brought in similar cases challenging the
adequacy of indigent defense systems elsewhere, seek to “avoid future harm” and “protect
constitutional rights.” Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1016–17. Consistent with the general standard for
obtaining such prospective relief, courts across the country have concluded that plaintiffs in these
cases need only demonstrate a “likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury, and
the inadequacy of remedies at law.” Id. at 1012, 1016–17 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488, 502 (1974)).

To establish a substantial risk of harm, Plaintiffs need not show that

prejudicial “ineffective assistance was inevitable for each of the class members.” Luckey, 860
F.2d at 1017. Nor must they establish that they have already suffered actual prejudice, as
required to obtain post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland.
See 566 U.S. at 697–698.
This Court itself implicitly appreciated that the substantial risk of harm test would apply
here. In remanding this case to the trial court, the Court pointed to the Eleventh Circuit’s
reasoning in Luckey, while observing that “systemic inadequacies” can give rise to a Sixth
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Amendment claim. Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19–20, 394 P.3d at 62–63. In Luckey, the plaintiffs
alleged substantial structural deficiencies in Georgia’s public defense system, including
inadequate resources, delays in appointments, time pressures, and inadequate supervision.
Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. To remedy these deficiencies, they sought an order requiring the state
to meet minimum constitutional standards in the provision of indigent defenses services. Id. at
1015. After explicitly considering whether to apply the ineffective assistance of trial counsel
standard set forth in Strickland, the Eleventh Circuit found that this outcome-driven analysis was
“inappropriate in a civil suit seeking prospective relief.” Id. at 1017.
As the Luckey court made clear, the Sixth Amendment does not just protect rights that
“affect the outcome of a trial.

Thus, deficiencies that do not meet the ‘ineffectiveness’

[Strickland] standard may nonetheless violate a defendant’s rights under the sixth amendment.”
Id. The Eleventh Circuit further explained that “[w]hether an accused has been prejudiced by the
denial of a right is an issue that relates to relief—whether the defendant is entitled to have his or
her conviction overturned—rather than to the question of whether such a right exists and can be
protected prospectively.” Id. The court concluded that to obtain prospective relief, plaintiffs
would need to show only that they face a substantial risk of harm. Id. at 1016–17.
Since Luckey, federal and state courts across the country considering similar structural
Sixth Amendment claims have also declined to engage in an individualized prejudice analysis;
instead applying the substantial risk of prospective harm test. In Kuren v. Luzerne County, 146
A.3d 715, 746–747 (Pa. 2016), for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court distinguished
Cronic and Strickland to conclude that:
“[B]ecause remedies for Sixth Amendment violations need not await conviction and
sentencing, we hold that such a cause of action [for prospective relief] exists, so long as
the class action plaintiffs demonstrate the likelihood of substantial and immediate
irreparable injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law.”
APPELLANTS’ BRIEF – Docket No. 46882-2019
18

Kuren, 146 A.3d at 718, 737–738, 744, 746 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In
finding previously that individualized inquiries were not necessary in this case, this Court itself
alluded to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Kuren, see Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19, 394
P.3d at 62, and specifically the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s observation that prospective Sixth
Amendment claims seeking injunctive relief “deal[] primarily, not with past violations, but with
threatened future ones,” warranting relief to “prevent future wrong,” even if “no right has yet
been violated.” Kuren, 146 A.3d at 747 (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326
(1928)).
Likewise, after a lengthy analysis, New York’s highest court held that the standard for
deciding “whether the State has met its foundational obligation under Gideon to provide legal
representation” in a systemic right to counsel case is whether “provision of counsel to indigent
defendants at all critical stages is at risk of being left unmet because of systemic conditions, not
by reason of the personal failings and poor professional decisions of individual attorneys.”
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 222, 226 (N.Y. 2010) (emphasis added); see also
Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d at 62 (citing Hurrell-Harring for proposition that “Strickland,
therefore, is inapplicable when systemic deficiencies in the provision of public defense are at
issue.”). When the case returned to that court later for consideration of what evidence was
admissible to meet plaintiffs’ burden, the court stated:
At its core, this litigation is about system-wide conditions relating to and affecting the
delivery of public defense—such as caseloads, funding and oversight, among others—
and whether these conditions . . . are such that the basic constitutional mandate for the
provision of counsel to indigent defendants at all critical stages is at risk of being left
unmet.
Hurrell-Harring v. State, 119 A.D.3d 1052, 1053 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (emphasis added)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also New York Cty. Lawyers’ Ass’n, 745
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N.Y.S.2d at 384 ("[T]hreatened injury is enough to satisfy the prejudice element and obtain
prospective injunctive relief to prevent further harm.").
The Michigan Court of Appeals also conducted a comprehensive review of public
defense system reform cases, approving those-including Luckey-that employed a risk-based
test for prospective relief and rejecting those that applied a case-by-case or ineffective assistance
of counsel-based standard. Duncan v. State, 774 N.W.2d 89, 128-132 (Mich. App. 2009), rev 'd
on other grounds, 784 N.W.2d 51 (Mich. 2010), aff'd on recons., 866 N.W.2d 407 (Mich. 2010).

The court held that evidence of "an absence of standards, training, programs, supervision,
monitoring, guidelines, and independence from the judicial and prosecutorial functions," and
"too many cases, insufficient support staff, insufficient or no resources to hire experts and
investigators, and a lack of skills and experience to properly handle assigned cases" was
sufficient to establish the requisite risk of harm. Duncan, 774 N.W.2d at 135. Each of these
cases look ultimately to systemic conditions and the risk of harm they perpetuate. 3
Other examples abound. Federal district courts across the country have embraced the
substantial risk of harm test in the context of public defense reform litigation. See, e.g, Kenny A.
ex rel. v. Perdue, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1362 (N.D. Ga. 2005) (embracing a "substantial risk"

standard and noting that "[e]vidence of 'systemic' deficiencies, such as inadequate resources for
appointed counsel, is sufficient to meet this standard" (citing Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1017)); Wilbur
v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124, 1127, 1131, 1134 (W.D. Wash. 2013)

(focusing on "the sheer number of cases" public defenders were saddled with, and finding
3

In its summary judgment order, the district court focused on differences in how this approach
was articulated in various opinions in these cases. See R., p. 5568-74. In material part,
however, these cases follow the same approach: they focus on the risk of future harm based on
system-wide policies and practices, not whether that harm has actually occurred for each
individual plaintiff or class member in each local jurisdiction. Plaintiffs address the district
court's question about the particular types of evidence that they may use to establish such a risk
of future harm in Section II, below.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF-Docket No. 46882-2019
20

liability based on proof of "systemic flaws that deprive indigent criminal defendants of their
Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.").
The highest courts in several other states have also accepted and applied the substantial
risk of harm test. In Public Defender v. State, 115 So. 3d 261, 279 (Fla. 2013), for example, the
Supreme Court of Florida employed the same substantial risk standard in analyzing excessive
caseload challenges, and noted that the standard had further basis in that state's bar rules, which
are similar to Idaho's. 4 See also, e.g., State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1381 (Ariz. 1984) (holding
that "there will be an inference that the adequacy of representation is adversely affected by the
system" when the public defense system did not structurally control workload, provide adequate
funding, or address attorney qualifications, even if there was no showing of inadequate
representation in individual cases); State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789, 791 (La. 1993)
(concluding that "systemic inadequacies in the Louisiana indigent defender system," including
the "chronic underfunding of indigent defense programs in most areas of the state" and
"excessive caseloads and the insufficient support with which their attorneys must work," called
for a presumption that indigent defendants were not receiving effective assistance of counsel);
Simmons v. State Pub. Def, 791 N.W.2d 69, 76-77 (Iowa 2010) (holding that "[i]n cases

involving systemic or structural challenges to the state's system of providing counsel, the focus
is not on a post-hoc historical review of a criminal trial," but rather on "the structure through
which indigent defense is provided by the state," and focusing on "a realistic assessment of
whether the state has provided an adequate framework for ensuring that the right to counsel is
realized").

4

Cf Idaho R. Profl Conduct 1.7(a)(2) (identifying conflict of interest where "there is a
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client").
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Plaintiffs’ claims fall in the same category: They seek prospective relief from structural
deficiencies that hamper the State’s public defense system. This Court should therefore join
federal and state courts from across the country in holding that to prevail on their claims,
Plaintiffs must only show a substantial risk of harm sufficient to warrant injunctive relief.
C. The Rationale Behind the Heightened Strickland Prejudice Standard Does Not
Apply to Claims for Prospective Relief.
There are good reasons why so many courts have held that the heightened standard
applicable to retrospective, Strickland-type claims for post-conviction relief does not apply to
prospective, systemic claims under the Sixth Amendment. These two types of claims arise at
different points in the criminal justice process and implicate very different policy concerns.
Overturning a criminal conviction, after the full adversarial process has been completed,
is a very different remedy than prospectively correcting system failures. When courts consider
retrospective, post-conviction relief, substantial resources of both the bench and the bar have
already been spent, and the public has an interest in the finality of criminal proceedings. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. Further, as the Supreme Court explained in Strickland:
[I]ntrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines
for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges.
Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to
be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful defense.
Counsel’s performance and even willingness to serve could be adversely affected.
Intensive scrutiny of counsel and rigid requirements for acceptable assistance
could dampen the ardor and impair the independence of defense counsel,
discourage the acceptance of assigned cases, and undermine the trust between
attorney and client.
Id. at 690.
It was for these reasons that the United States Supreme Court formulated the heightened
standards for individuals to obtain retrospective post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance
of counsel. In Strickland, the Court held that a defendant is required to (1) “show that counsel’s
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performance was deficient” and (2) “show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.” Id. at 687. And to affirmatively prove prejudice, a criminal defendant must clear a
high bar: demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 693–694. On the same day that
Strickland was decided, the Court noted in its companion case, Cronic, that post-conviction relief
may be warranted, even absent a showing of prejudice, where a criminal defendant shows (1)
“the complete denial of counsel” or (2) constructive denials of counsel where “counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” 466 U.S. at 659. State
courts across the country have followed suit. Indeed, this Court ruled in Murray v. State, 156
Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014), that Article I, Section 13 of the Idaho State
Constitution requires the same standard for post-conviction relief.
The finality and judicial economy concerns that motivate the heightened Strickland,
Cronic, and Murray standards, however, are not present in cases like this one, seeking
prospective relief based on systemic deficiencies to prevent ineffective assistance of counsel
from occurring in the first place. In prospective relief cases these policies cut the other way.
Rather than necessitating waste or even duplication of resources by criminally prosecuting an
individual defendant whose conviction might later be vacated due to a constitutional violation, a
forward-looking remedy in such cases preserves the use of unexpended resources. The goals of
ensuring constitutionally-sufficient representation, increasing judicial efficiency, and protecting
defense attorney independence will be served, not harmed, by the prospective system-wide
remedies sought here.
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For this reason, and consistent with the general principle that prospective relief requires a
substantial risk of future harm, courts have declined to apply the Strickland, Cronic, and Murray
standards in the context of systemic Sixth Amendment claims. This Court should do the same.
D. In Analogous Civil Rights Cases, Courts Across the Country Have Likewise
Applied the Substantial Likelihood of Future Harm Standard to Assess Claims
for Prospective Relief.
The substantial risk of harm test 1s not unique to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
Numerous courts, including both the United States Supreme Court and this Court, have also
applied this standard in considering structural challenges seeking prospective relief in closely
analogous contexts.
In Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011), for example, the United States Supreme Court
itself invoked the threatened harm standard in examining two systemic civil rights class actions
involving jail and prison conditions in facilities across the state of California. The Court took
pains to make clear that the plaintiffs in those cases needed only to show systemic deficiencies,
not granular evidence of individualized harm: "Because plaintiffs do not base their case on
deficiencies in care provided on any one occasion, this Court has no occasion to consider
whether these [specific] instances of delay-or any other particular deficiency in medical care
complained of by the plaintiffs-would violate the Constitution." Brown, 563 U.S. at 505 n.3.
Rather, "Plaintiffs rely on systemwide deficiencies in the provision of medical and mental health
care that, taken as a whole, subject sick and mentally ill prisoners in California to 'substantial
risk of serious harm."' Id. (citation omitted). 5

5

Dicta from the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996), is not
contradictory. In Lewis, the Supreme Court found that the expansive injunctive relief regarding
law library collections and access ordered by the district court against the entire Arizona penal
system was unwarranted to remedy so-called Bounds violations. Bounds, the Court pointed out,
guaranteed prisoners access to the courts in one way or another, but did not require specific
access to or quality of prison libraries, as to which the broad prisoner class in the case
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This Court reached the same conclusion a half dozen years earlier in Idaho Schools for
Equal Educational Opportunity v. State. The plaintiffs there sought systemic enforcement of the

Idaho Constitution's guarantee of a "thorough system of public, free common schools." 142
Idaho 450, 453, 129 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2005) (hereinafter "ISEEO V''). The State complained that
the district court's findings were generalized conclusions about the statewide education system,
arguing-much as they do regarding individual plaintiffs and counties here-that the plaintiffs
instead had to prove "specific facts" about "particular facilities in specific school districts" in
order to prevail. Id. at 455, 129 P.3d at 1204. But this Court squarely rejected that approach,
holding that the "issue is systemic in nature" and the question therefore was "whether the
Legislature has provided a means to fund facilities that provide a safe environment conducive to
learning, not whether each Plaintiff school district's facilities were adequate" individually. Id.
The Court characterized the State's arguments-which are strikingly similar to those made in
this case-as "attempts to refocus this litigation into small, district-by-district battles instead of
addressing the larger, overall issue of the Legislature's constitutional duty towards public
education in Idaho." Id. Again echoing the instant case, the Court observed that, "[I]n short, the
State fails to grasp the relevance of the adage 'the whole is greater than the sum of its parts."' Id.
A survey across diverse civil rights cases reveals a reliance on this same fundamental
standard again and again. The Fifth Circuit, for example, examined a Fourteenth Amendment
complained. The Court noted that the district court had found only two instances of deprivations
of access to the courts, both involving illiterate prisoners, and as to which vastly narrower
remedies could have been crafted. Id. at 348-349. And given that the systemic impact evidence
focused on allegedly deficient prison library system resources, rather than on "past or imminent"
actual harm in the way of restrictions on court access, the Court reversed the district court's
system-wide injunction. Id. at 349, 360. In issuing its ruling, the Court made clear that "[i]t is
this overreaching of the evidentiary record, not the application of standing or even class-action
rules, that calls for the judgment to be reversed." Id. at 398. In other words, had there been
systemic evidence of harm to prisoner court access, as there is here regarding Idaho's public
defense system, Lewis would have been a different case, more like the many discussed in the text
above and below.
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class action challenge to Texas’s foster care system and held that the “State’s policies with
respect to caseload management, monitoring, and oversight violate plaintiffs’ right to be free
from a substantial risk of serious harm on a class-wide basis . . . ” M.D. ex rel. v. Abbott, 907
F.3d 237, 271 (5th Cir. 2018); see also B.K. ex rel. v. Snyder, 922 F.3d 957, 971 (9th Cir. 2019)
(“The plaintiffs have not brought a concatenation of individual claims that must be redressed
through individual injunctions; they have brought unified claims that a specified set of
centralized . . . policies and practices of uniform and statewide application have placed them at a
substantial risk of harm.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); M.B. ex rel. v. Corsi,
327 F.R.D. 271, 280 (W.D. Mo. 2018) (applying “substantial risk of serious harm” analysis to
systemic foster care class action claims arising under Fourteenth Amendment) (emphasis and
citation omitted). Other courts have applied the same standard across the spectrum of civil rights
actions, including in Eighth Amendment challenges, see Parsons v. Ryan, 754 F.3d 657, 676 (9th
Cir. 2014) (“The Complaint does not allege that the care provided on any particular occasion to
any particular inmate (or group of inmates) was insufficient . . . , but rather that ADC policies
and practices of statewide and systemic application expose all inmates in ADC custody to a
substantial risk of serious harm.”); Medicaid Act class actions, see Markva v. Haveman, 168 F.
Supp. 2d 695, 719 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (holding that “risk of further injury to health warrants
injunctive relief”), aff’d, 317 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2003); Americans with Disabilities Act claims,
see J.S.X. ex rel. v. Foxhoven, No. 4:17-CV-00417-SMR-HCA, 2019 WL 1147144, at *8 (S.D.
Iowa Mar. 13, 2019); Equal Protection and voting rights challenges, see Curling v.
Raffensperger, -- F. Supp. 3d --, No. 1:17-CV-2989-AT, 2019 WL 3822123, at *55 (N.D. Ga.
Aug. 15, 2019) (granting preliminary injunction after finding Plaintiffs showed “imminent risk of
harm in the burdening or deprivation of [voting] rights in the upcoming 2019 elections”); and
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Sixth Amendment access to courts claims made by pretrial detainees, see Benjamin v. Fraser,
264 F.3d 175, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (granting prospective relief in attorney visitation case without
requiring proof of actual injury).
In short, this Court will not break new legal ground by reconfirming its own precedent,
and again holding as other courts have held that the substantial risk of harm standard is the
appropriate test in the context of a systemic Sixth Amendment right to counsel case like this one.
II.

The Plaintiffs' Burden: To Show That a Public Defense System Subjects Indigent
Defendants to a Substantial Risk of Harm, Plaintiffs Must Identify Structural
Deficiencies That Likely Will Result In Indigent Defendants Receiving
Representation That Fails to Meet Constitutional Standards.
Sixth Amendment cases like this one are about the risks of harm created by system-wide,

structural features of a state's public defense system. It is no surprise, then, that to evaluate
whether injunctive relief is warranted, courts focus their analysis on the extent to which those
structural features are consistent with applicable standards-for example, caseload standards
promulgated by the ABA and NAC. Courts also consider expert testimony on the risks that
structural deficiencies pose to the quality of indigent defense. See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State,
119 A.D.3d 1052, 1054 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) (observing that testimony from public defense
system experts that goes beyond "case-by-case determinations" should be admitted to explain
"the operation of public defense systems, the professional standards applicable to such systems,
and the impact of systemic shortcomings."). 6 Here, the evidence of structural defects that
Plaintiffs have adduced-including aggregate statistics based on the State's own documents and

6

The expert testimony in Hurrell-Harring provided the proof that the court expected when it
held, earlier in that case, that the plaintiffs needed to prove that "deprivations of counsel to
indigent defendants are not simply isolated occurrences ... but are a common or routine
happenstance in the counties." Hurrell-Harring v. State, 81 A.D.3d 69, 75 (N.Y. App. Div.
2011).
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expert testimony—is more than enough to establish a substantial risk of future harm warranting
injunctive relief.
Though the circumstances surrounding particular cases or the conduct of specific
defenders may or may not epitomize the effects of structural deficiencies, such evidence is not
the most probative of flaws in the system itself. Rather, in determining the merits of Plaintiffs’
case, the Court will be best served by evaluating the reports, assessments, applications, contracts,
deposition and expert witness testimony, and other evidence of systemic deficiencies within the
system. As such, the Court should reject the State’s attempt to devalue this important class
action seeking prospective, system-wide relief from structural deficiencies by warping it into a
chain of hundreds of individual, Strickland-like ineffective assistance of counsel analyses.
A. Evidence Exposing Recognized Structural Deficiencies In Indigent Defense
Frameworks That Present a Substantial Risk of Harm Is the Paradigmatic Evidence
Necessary to Prove Systemic Class Claims.
The kinds of structural deficiencies within indigent defense systems that threaten
defendants’ right to effective assistance of counsel are no secret.

In a long line of cases

addressing systemic challenges like this one, state and federal courts, as well as the Department
of Justice, have identified common structural defects that elevate the risk that indigent
defendants will suffer unconstitutional harm.

The ABA has also established very similar

minimum standards that public defense systems should meet to avoid a risk of harm to indigent
defendants.
Excessive workloads, for example, have been repeatedly identified as a structural defect
that drastically increases the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel for any indigent defendant
facing the prospect of being represented by an overburdened attorney. In Wilbur, the United
States District Court for the Western District of Washington recognized that high caseloads
result in a public defense system that functions as little more than a “meet and plead” system.
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989 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.

Similarly, a Colorado court recognized that “excessive

caseload[s] . . . interfere with [a defender’s] ability to provide competent representation to his
clients.” People v. Roberts, 321 P.3d 581, 588–589 (Colo. App. 2013). And the Florida
Supreme Court observed the reality that “the public defender’s lack of adequate resources or
excessive caseload is likely to affect each client’s case differently in the pretrial context as the
attorney ‘juggles’ the cases against each other in ‘triage.’” Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Cir. of
Fla., 115 So. 3d at 274; see also Hatten v. State, 561 So. 2d 562, 563 (Fla. 1990) (recognizing
that excessive caseloads in the public defender’s office preclude effective representation of
indigent clients).
Policies that undermine the independence of defenders from potentially adverse political
entities likewise threaten the right to effective assistance of counsel. As the United States
Supreme Court recognized years ago, “it is the constitutional obligation of the State to respect
the professional independence of the public defenders whom it engages.” Polk Cty., 454 U.S. at
321–322; see also Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 204 (1979) (“[A]n indispensable element of
the effective performance of [a public defender’s] responsibilities is the ability to act
independently of the Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation.”).
Fixed-fee contracts, or their functional equivalent, are another known structural defect
that continues to taint the Idaho indigent defense system. As a Georgia court recognized, public
defense contracts that “create[] an economic disincentive for [defending attorneys] to perform
adequate investigations . . . discourage[] preparation, and ultimately affect[] the quality of
representation” lead to a substantial risk that indigent defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights will
be violated. Flournoy v. State, No. 2009CV1789487, 2010 WL 9037133, at *32 (Ga. Super. Ct.
Feb. 23, 2010) (citing New York Cty. Lawyers Ass’n, 745 N.Y.S.2d at 376); see also State ex rel.
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v. Smith, 74 7 P .2d 816, 842 (Kan. 1987) ("When the attorney is required to advance expense

funds out-of-pocket for an indigent, without full reimbursement, the system violates the Fifth
Amendment.").
Other established structural deficiencies in public defense systems include delayed
appointment and assistance of counsel, 7 inadequate access to investigation and expert resources, 8
and insufficient lawyer training and qualifications. 9 A number of courts have also highlighted
the risks presented by the debilitating impact of underfunding on staffing and resources. 10
Not surprisingly, the structural features courts have found wanting in some public
defense frameworks correspond to the ABA's Ten Principles. 11 The United States Supreme

7

Rothgery v. Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008); Tucker, 162 Idaho at 20, 394 P.3d at
63.
8

Parity, as required under the ABA Ten Principles, includes parity in access to investigators,
forensic services, and experts. ABA Ten Principles at 3; see also Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at
1132-33; Flournoy, 2010 WL 9037133, at *32; State v. Young, 172 P.3d 138 (N.M. 2007);
Smith, 747 P.2d at 842; see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 ("[W]hen a State brings its judicial power to
bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to assure the defendant
has a fair opportunity to present his defense."); State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 419, 348 P.3d
1, 34 (2015) ("The denial of access to the basic tools of an adequate defense impinges on the
defendant's due process right to a fair trial.").
9

See, e.g., Miranda v. Clark Cty., Nev., 319 F.3d 465, 471 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
deliberate pattern of failing to train lawyers for cases they would handle as public defenders
amounted to "deliberate indifference" to defendants' Constitutional rights).
10

See also Peart, 621 So. 2d at 789 (identifying "systemic inadequacies in the Louisiana
indigent defender system" including the "chronic underfunding of indigent defense programs in
most areas of the state" which resulted in the constructive denial of counsel); Hurrell-Harring,
930 N.E.2d at 224 (recognizing systemic Sixth Amendment claims related to "inadequate
funding and staffing of indigent defense providers"); Kuren, 146 A.3d at 743 (recognizing Sixth
Amendment claim where "widespread, systematic and constructive denial of counsel" occurred
due to "deficiencies in funding and resources").
11

Workloads: "Defense counsel's workload is controlled to permit the rendering of quality
representation." ABA Ten Principles at 2 ("National caseload standards [of 150 felonies, 400
misdemeanors, 200 juvenile, 200 mental health, or 25 appeals per year] should in no event be

APPELLANTS' BRIEF-Docket No. 46882-2019
30

Court and the Idaho Supreme Court routinely look to ABA standards for guidance in analyzing
constitutional right to counsel requirements. 12 Further, the Idaho legislature largely incorporated

exceeded ... "); accord I.C. § 19-850(1 )(a)(vii)(3) ("Defending attorneys' workloads should
permit effective representation.").
Delayed appointment: "Clients are screened for eligibility, and defense counsel is
assigned and notified of appointment, as soon as feasible after clients' arrest, detention, or
request for counsel." ABA Ten Principles at 2 ("Counsel should be furnished upon arrest,
detention, or request, and usually within 24 hours thereafter."); cf R., p. 10912.
Investigators and experts: "There should be parity of workload, salaries and other
resources (such as benefits, technology, facilities, legal research, support staff, paralegals,
investigators, and access to forensic services and experts) between prosecution and public
defense." ABA Ten Principles at 3; accord LC. § 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(7) ("There should be
reasonable equity between defending attorneys and prosecuting attorneys with respect to
resources, staff and facilities.").
Training and qualifications: "Defense counsel's ability, training, and experience match
the complexity of the case." ABA Ten Principles at 3; accord I.C. § 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(5)
("Defending attorneys' abilities, training and experience should match the nature and complexity
of the cases in which they provide services including, but not limited to, cases involving complex
felonies, juveniles and child protection.").
Contracts: "Contracts with private attorneys for public defense services should never be
let primarily on the basis of cost; they should specify performance requirements and the
anticipated workload, provide an overflow or funding mechanism for excess, unusual, or
complex cases, and separately fund expert, investigative, and other litigation support services."
ABA Ten Principles at 3; cf I.C. § 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(4) ("Economic disincentives or incentives
that impair defending attorneys' ability to provide effective representation should be avoided.");
I.C. § 19-859(4) ("[T]he terms of the [public defense] contract shall not include any pricing
structure that charges or pays a single fixed fee for the services and expenses of the attorney.").
Independence: "The public defense function, including the selection, funding, and
payment of defense counsel," must be "independent from political influence and subject to
judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same extent as retained counsel." ABA
Ten Principles at 2; accord I.C. § 19-850(1)(a)(vii)(l) ("The delivery of indigent defense
services should be independent of political and judicial influence, though the judiciary is
encouraged to contribute information and advice concerning the delivery of indigent defense
services.").
12

See, e.g., Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012) ("The American Bar Association
recommends defense counsel 'promptly communicate and explain to the defendant all plea offers
made by the prosecuting attorney' ... and this standard has been adopted by numerous state and
federal courts over the last 30 years") (citation omitted); Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367368 (2010); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387 (2005) (noting that the ABA standards
describe the obligations of defense counsel "in terms no one could misunderstand"); Strickland,
466 U.S. at 688; cf State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989) (holding
that ABA standards are "the starting point" in evaluating effective assistance of counsel under
the Idaho Constitution), overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d
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the ABA Ten Principles into the rulemaking mandate of the enabling statute of Idaho's own
State Public Defense Commission. See, I.C. § 19-850. And the PDC itself has acknowledged
that achievement of the standards set forth in the ABA Ten Principles (except, it claims,
Principle 7 on vertical representation and Principle 10 on supervision) is necessary for a system
to meet constitutional requirements. R., p. 9976:8-9977:4.
Existing case law and the ABA Ten Principles thus offer the framework against which to
assess the risks of constitutional deprivation presented by Idaho's indigent defense system.
Here, after a lengthy discovery period, Plaintiffs have adduced ample evidenceincluding aggregated data based on documents produced by the State and expert testimonyestablishing that Idaho's indigent defense system suffers from known structural flaws and fails to
meet ABA standards based on those known flaws. As discussed in the Statement of the Case,
above at 4-14, Plaintiffs' evidence shows that defenders in many counties are burdened with
excessive caseloads; that representation of both in-custody and out-of-custody indigent
defendants at initial appearances continues to be inconsistent or non-existent; that defending
attorneys are subjected to undue political and judicial influence; that numerous counties continue
to employ fixed-fee contracts, or their functional equivalent, thereby incentivizing hasty work
over quality advocacy; that defenders lack adequate supervision, training, and evaluations; that
crucial resources for investigation and experts are limited and underused; and that a tiny minority
of cases go to trial. This evidence shows that Idaho's statewide public defense system suffers
from glaring structural defects. It is more than enough to meet Plaintiffs' burden to show a
substantial risk of future harm sufficient to warrant an injunction.

1081 (1991); State v. Perez, 99 Idaho 181, 184, 579 P.2d 127, 129 (1978); Murphy v. State, 143
Idaho 139, 146, 139 P.3d 741, 748 (Ct. App. 2006).
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B. Retrospective Strickland-Type Proof of Prejudicial Outcomes Is Unnecessary and
Would Be Neither Indicative of Nor Helpful In Assessing the Risks of Future
Constitutional Harm to the Properly Certified Class.
Notwithstanding the compelling evidence of widespread structural defects posing a
substantial risk of harm that Plaintiffs have marshalled, the State has argued that Plaintiffs have
not met their burden of proof, because they have not shown that class members in every county
have suffered harm as a result of each type of deficiency that exists in Idaho’s public defense
system. R., p. 2573–74, 2599. The State’s attempt to focus on case-by-case-type harm inquiries
is inconsistent with the substantial risk of harm standard applicable to systemic challenges, and
the nature of class actions in general. It also inappropriately prioritizes individualized evidence
that obviously is not most probative of statewide conditions presenting a substantial risk of harm.
The Court should reject the State’s misguided approach.
First, the legal errors: Requiring proof of actual harm in each county, as the State
proposes, would be tantamount to imposing the individualized, heightened prejudice standard
that applies to retrospective claims for post-conviction relief under Strickland. As discussed
above, and as this Court has recognized, that standard does not apply to prospective, systemic
claims like Plaintiffs’. See Tucker, 162 Idaho at 19, 394 P.3d at 62 (holding this case does not
necessitate “case-by-case inquiries.”). Rather, Plaintiffs need only show that the State’s policies
and practices—which apply statewide—create a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants.
As mentioned above, this Court rejected in ISEEO V a county-by-county approach that
was nearly identical to the one the State proposes here. ISEEO V addressed systemic issues in
the State’s education system. This Court found that because the lawsuit challenged whether the
State had met its constitutional obligations, it was not appropriate to litigate “small, district-bydistrict battles” about whether “each Plaintiff school district’s facilities were adequate”
notwithstanding the State’s policies. ISEEO V, 142 Idaho at 455, 129 P.3d at 1205. Instead, the
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focus was on structural defects in the State’s education system as a whole. So too here:
Plaintiffs must put on evidence of how the statewide indigent defense system in Idaho threatens
the constitutional right of indigent defendants.
The State’s proposed standard would also be inconsistent with the law of class actions
and the certified class here. Proof that all class members suffered the same actual harm as
Plaintiffs is unnecessary to obtain prospective relief in a class action. Rather, once a named
plaintiff establishes standing on behalf of herself—i.e. by showing actual harm—“any issues
regarding the relationship between the class representative and the passive class members—such
as dissimilarity in injuries suffered—are relevant only to class certification.” Melendres v.
Arpaio, 784 F.3d 1254, 1262 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Wright & Miller, 7AA Fed. Practice &
Procedure § 1785.1 (3d ed.) (noting that once a class representative has established standing,
“the question whether [she] may be allowed to present claims on behalf of others who have
similar, but not identical, interests depends not on standing, but on an assessment of typicality
and adequacy of representation” as part of the class certification inquiry).
Here, the district court has already found that the named Plaintiffs meet the commonality,
typicality, and adequacy requirements to represent a class of all indigent persons formally
charged before an Idaho state court. R., p. 921. As the district court found, the named Plaintiffs’
“individual experiences with their public defenders are typical of experiences faced by other
indigent criminal defendants across the State of Idaho, including lack of representation at initial
appearances, lack of time or space for meaningful communications with their public defender(s),
and having public defenders with overwhelming caseloads.” R., p. 921. Further, the named
Plaintiffs and all class members are exposed to the same State policies and practices, and this
common harm may be remediated by the same requested injunctive relief requiring the State to
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change those policies and practices. R., p. 915–918 (citing Tucker, 162 Idaho at 21, 25–26, 394
P.3d at 64, 68–69).
Plaintiffs therefore need not adduce evidence that each individual named Plaintiff or class
member suffered harm as a result of each specific deficiency that exists in Idaho’s public defense
framework in order to establish that the system contains structural limitations that create a
substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants in general. Since the class was properly certified,
Plaintiffs “ha[ve] been broadened to include the class as a whole, and no longer simply those
named in the complaint.” Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 871 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Hill v.
City of New York, 136 F. Supp. 3d 304, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), order amended and supplemented,
No. 13-CV-6147 (PKC) (JO), 2019 WL 1900503 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2019) (“[T]hat the named
Plaintiffs did not personally experience each manifestation of the City Defendants’ overall
course of discriminatory treatment of the 911 Operators does not, as City Defendants contend,
destroy standing to seek class-wide injunctive relief in a pattern or practice case. Rather,
Plaintiffs may present evidence of the universal applicability of the City Defendants’ policies
and practices as proof of the overarching pattern of discriminatory conduct.”). Thus, the district
court should consider the risks that the State’s policies and practices pose to all class members—
i.e., all current and future indigent defendants in the State of Idaho—in determining whether
indigent defendants face a substantial risk of harm.
In addition to the legal problems plaguing the State’s approach, focusing on county-level
evidence would be unhelpful as a factual matter. Proof that one or ten or even fifty indigent
defendants were, or were not, convicted as a result of ineffective legal assistance does not show
that the structural condition of the State’s entire defense system is, or is not, constitutionally
adequate. Nor would evidence that one or ten or a hundred defense attorneys did, or did not,
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provide effective legal representation in given cases, indicate that the services of all defenders
were, or were not, constitutionally adequate.

Nor would evidence that one or a handful of

counties managed to keep caseloads at a reasonable level, notwithstanding the State's failure to
adequately regulate caseloads generally, allow a factfinder to conclude that the State's inaction
did not present a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants in other counties. Otherwise, this
case would be merely an aggregate adjudication of post-conviction relief claims. This is why
courts considering public defense system reform challenges instead consider the extent to which
structural components of the system itself are likely to present a substantial risk to the
effectiveness of the services provided by counsel working within the system.
The ultimate question in this case is whether the overall conditions created by the State's
policies (or the lack thereof) put indigent defendants across the state at substantial risk of
receiving constitutionally inadequate representation. See R., p. 914-915 (confirming that this
case would focus on "the State and the PDC' s policies and practices concerning public defender
services in the State of Idaho."); see also Parsons, 754 F.3d at 678, 681 ("What all members of
the putative class . . . have in common is their alleged exposure, as a result of specified
statewide [department of corrections'] policies and practices that govern the overall conditions of
health care services ... to a substantial risk of serious future harm to which the defendants are
allegedly deliberately indifferent."). Plaintiffs have shown that the State's policies and practices
caused numerous structural defects in many counties. That is all that is required to show that the
State's policies and practices present a substantial risk of harm to indigent defendants across the
State.
CONCLUSION
By establishing and maintaining an indigent defense system replete with well-known
structural deficiencies, the State subjects indigent defendants in Idaho to a substantial risk that
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they will suffer unconstitutional harm. Plaintiffs need demonstrate only this substantial risk to
warrant the prospective relief they seek here.

They can meet this burden without proving

specific defects and actual harm in each one of Idaho's counties.
ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL

Plaintiffs argue their entitlement to fees on this appeal to ensure that they will preserve
their right to claim those fees either in seeking an interim fee award or should they prevail on the
merits in this case. See Idaho App. R. 41(a).
Plaintiffs seek attorneys' fees from Defendants pursuant to Idaho App. R. 41, LC. § 12121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e), as well as the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
Idaho's private attorney general doctrine provides for recovery of attorneys' fees in actions of
widespread importance to Idahoans. See Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 578, 682, P.2d
524, 531 (1984). Similarly, the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, exists
to "ensure effective access to the judicial process for persons with civil rights grievances."
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs

seek to enforce important fundamental rights being denied to Idahoans to this day due to the
State's longstanding and ongoing failure to ensure constitutionally effective indigent defense
services. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys' fees.
In determining whether to award attorneys' fees under Idaho's private attorney general
doctrine, courts consider: (1) the strength or societal importance of the public policy indicated by
the litigation, (2) the necessity for private enforcement and the magnitude of the resultant burden
on the plaintiff, and (3) the number of people standing to benefit. Hellar, 160 Idaho at 578, 682
P.2d at 531 (awarding attorneys' fees under the private attorney general doctrine in a case
brought to ensure that Idahoans were constitutionally represented in the state legislature). This
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case meets all three criteria. First, the vast attention drawn to this case from all three branches of
government and from major media outlets both within and outside of Idaho for over nine years
bears witness to the great societal importance of the issues raised herein.
Second, private enforcement became necessary because Idaho officials failed for years to
ensure the fundamental and essential rights of indigent defendants at stake in this case: the
Governor's Commission created a committee, which recommended creating another committee,
which recommended creating a statewide commission, which has failed-even after a statutory
mandate-to promulgate and enforce the full complement of necessary rules and standards to
govern indigent defense delivery across the state. Only after Plaintiffs took on the burden of
prosecuting this lawsuit did Idahoans see any meaningful movement toward systemic reform.
Plaintiffs spent more than nine years investigating the scope of the statewide crisis and urging
systemic reform. They have devoted extraordinary amounts of time and resources since those
efforts failed to privately enforcing these fundamental rights through this litigation.
Finally, indigent criminal defendants with pending charges in courts throughout Idaho, as
well as all future indigent criminal defendants in the state, stand to benefit from the outcome of
this case. Given the gravity of the human and constitutional rights at stake, the burden born by
the Plaintiffs in seeking to vindicate those rights, and the sheer scope of the impact of a favorable
outcome in this case, Plaintiffs are clearly entitled to fees under Idaho's private attorney general
doctrine if they prevail.
Plaintiffs are also entitled to attorneys' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, since their federal and state law claims are based on the same facts. 13
13

See Farner v. Idaho Falls Sch. Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 337, 342, 17 P.3d 281,286 (2000)
(reasoning that because a class of teachers' "federal claims relied upon the same facts as their
state law claims, the Teachers are entitled to recover all of their attorney fees under § 1988");
Lowder v. Minidoka Cty. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 331, 132 Idaho 834, 840--41, 979 P.2d 1192, 1198APPELLANTS' BRIEF-Docket No. 46882-2019
38

The Civil Rights Attorney Fees Awards Act was specifically intended "to authorize fee awards
payable by the States when their officials are sued in their official capacities." Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678, 679, 693-694 (1978). Under Section 1988, plaintiffs "should ordinarily recover
an attorney's fee" when they prevail on a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Plaintiffs will be prevailing parties if the actual
relief ordered by the Court materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by
modifying the State's behavior in a way that would directly benefit the Plaintiffs.

See

Cunningham v. Waford, 131 Idaho 841, 843, 965 P.2d 201,203 (Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Farrar
v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-112 (1992)).
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

For the foregoing reasons, Appellants respectfully urge this Court to order that:
1.
The legal standard to be used in a lawsuit challenging the public defense system for the
State of Idaho is whether the system maintained by the State and its PDC presents a substantial
risk of future unconstitutional harm to indigent defendants.
2.
Appellants may meet this burden by showing a substantial risk that the State's policies
and practices will result in indigent defendants receiving representation that fails to meet
constitutional standards; and that Appellants need not show that each structural defect is present
in each county in Idaho.
3.
Appellants are entitled to attorneys' fees and costs related to this appeal if they ultimately
prevail in the case or if an interim fee award is otherwise warranted because (1) the constitutional
obligation to provide defense services to members of the public in Idaho who cannot afford it is
of great societal importance; (2) the strength of this public policy was discounted by the State
and its PDC for years and in spite of diligent, persistent and costly efforts born by PlaintiffAppellees, and others; and (3) the number of people standing to benefit from a favorable
outcome include all Idaho indigent defendants now and into the future.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2019.
/s/ Richard Eppink
RICHARD EPPINK
Attorney for Appellants
99 (1999) (awarding attorney's fees under § 1988 for a successful appeal of mixed state and
federal claims); Lubcke v. Boise City/Ada Cty. Haus. Auth., 124 Idaho 450, 454--455, 468, 860
P.2d 653, 657-658, 671 (1993) (same).
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